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Abstract. Uncertainty influences a decision maker’s choices when making sequential 
capital investment decisions. With the possibility of extremely negative cash inflows, 
firms may need to curtail operations significantly. Traditional Net Present Value analysis 
does not allow for efficient management of these problems. In addition, firm managers 
may behave irrationally by accepting negative Net Present Value projects in the short 
term. This paper presents a Monte Carlo simulation based model to provide policy insights 
on how to incorporate extreme cash flows and manager irrationality scenarios into the 
capital budgeting process. This paper presents evidence that firms with irrational managers 
and experiencing extremely negative cash flows may, under certain conditions, reap long 
term rewards associated with the acceptance of negative Net Present Value projects in the 
short term. These benefits are largest if cost ratios (discount rates) are small, or investment 
horizons are high. We argue that acceptance of short term negative Net Present Value 
projects implies the purchase of a long term real option which can generate positive long 
term cash flows under certain conditions.
Keywords: sequential capital investment, extreme values, Monte Carlo simulation, real 
options, uncertainty, net present value.
JEL Classification: G31, G32.
Introduction
In general, three important factors, namely, sunk cost, risk and the option to shutdown, 
influence corporate decision making regard capital investments. Investment cost outlays 
generally tend to be large and irreversible with low residual values once adopted. 
Project risk (defined by uncertainties in future revenues and costs over time) can impact 
acceptance decisions. 
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However, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global subprime crisis have 
forced firms to consider that the unpleasant impact of major negative shocks1 (possibly 
occurring at the tail end of probability distributions), can make a profitable project 
turn sour and render traditional net present value (NPV) analysis less effective. Well 
established/experienced firms may be expected to handle such problems easily, but 
the 1980 Union Carbide tragedy suggests that even such firms are not immune to the 
resultant negative aftermath of a crisis.
Managers also invest in negative NPV projects because of overconfidence placed on 
their subjective estimates of cash flows and may continue to invest in short run negative 
NPV projects in the belief that project cash flows will become positive in the long run. 
Informational asymmetries related to project cash flows between the manager and those 
directly involved in the project can exacerbate such problems if managers underestimate 
the probability and/or the amount of loss if projects fail. Under extreme cash flow (ECF) 
conditions, the tendency to continue investments in negative NPV projects can increase 
firm losses because of possible simultaneous compounding of agency and information 
asymmetry problems. On the plus side, a manager’s tendency to persist with short 
run negative NPV projects can provide long term gains for the firm. There is casual 
empirical evidence that firms can receive unexpected benefits by persisting with short 
term negative NPV projects2.
However, there is no guarantee that a project profitable in the short term will always 
generate profits in the long term. Rational Union Carbide managers would have had 
little reason to terminate operations during the crisis faced by the Bhopal subsidiary 
of the firm in the 1980s. Nevertheless, in hindsight, the Bhopal tragedy indicates that 
the subsidiary should have been closed completely before the tragedy occurred. An 
aggressive manager may have irrationally terminated the positive NPV project in the 
short term, and these actions would have been the correct one, in light of subsequent 
events. Furthermore, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the recent British Petroleum Gulf of 
Mexico related problems (to name a few)3 suggest that firms now face situations where 
good projects can go bad in a hurry. Yet, these firms did not curtail these projects, but 
instead dealt with it in a systematic way to the extent that we can now conclude that 
full recovery has taken place for most of these affected firms. The message here is that 
if managers take short-term risks (as an aggressive manager would), or face an extreme/
unexpected catastrophic loss situation, they have two choices. They can continue with 
the unprofitable project, or terminate it. These decisions can generate profits for the 
firm over the long term. 
To date, and to the best of our knowledge, there have been little attempts in the aca-
demic literature to provide guidance for managers on how to handle extreme negative 
1 These situations can be viewed as extreme cash flow shocks to the firm.
2 Or when they are forced to sell assets in a host country, for instance, under forced nationalizations. 
This evidence is documented later in the paper.
3 More examples of firms facing catastrophic (or extreme) events can be found in Knight and Pretty 
(1996). 
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cash flow uncertainty. Since the incidence of extreme crisis type situations has increased 
in recent times, firms may benefit from proactive management of such situations. In ad-
dition, given the paucity of academic papers addressing both types of extreme scenarios 
(ECFs and the presence of aggressive managers) simultaneously, we develop a simu-
lation-based model that accommodates both scenarios within a traditional framework. 
Using this model, we attempt to provide simulation-based answers to the following 
questions: Does a firm benefit from continuing to invest in projects unprofitable in the 
short term? Should firms tolerate managers who are predisposed to assuming greater 
risks? Will their persistence with projects unprofitable in the short run pay off in the 
long run? Will the possibly of extreme cash flows influence these results?
1. Literature review
The literature is replete with examples of how uncertainty in future expected cash flows 
should be handled when making capital investments. The future uncertain stochastic 
outcome (the future cash flows) has been modeled as a single period valuation model 
(Sharpe 1964), a multi-period one (Rubinstein 1976), or as a model using option pricing 
theory (Black, Scholes 1973). Other developments that address some of the limitations 
of earlier models include the works of Merton et al. (1977), and Cox et al. (1979). 
Textbooks recommend the NPV, the adjusted NPV, or the real options methodologies, 
to handle investment uncertainty (Abel et al. 1996). Real option models have been 
suggested as a way to address investment decisions when there is demand uncertainty.
The real options model is more appropriate for evaluating firm investment decisions 
when uncertainty can be resolved within the investment horizon period, such as when 
firms face options to abandon, expand, or contract (Dixit 1989; Pindyck 1991; List, Haigh 
2010; Denison et al. 2012; Sewalk, Dai 2014). Researchers have generally formulated 
real options models using three popular processes, namely, geometric Brownian motion, 
mean reversion process, and the lattice model. Whereas the geometric Brownian motion 
process provides closed form solutions when price uncertainties are present (Brennan, 
Schwartz 1985; Tsekrekos et al. 2012), they do not provide an equilibrium price process. 
Next, although the mean reversion process is better able to model uncertain cash flows 
and provide an equilibrium price process, the generated results underestimate volatility 
and discount rate biases (Lund 1993). Researchers have included an infrequent jump 
process to combat these biases (Dixit 1994; Hubbard 1994; Chang, Chen 2012). In addi-
tion, these models are better able to capture situations where large cash flow shocks are 
prevalent (for instance, those induced by pandemic financial crises and/or war). Finally, 
the lattice model is more appropriate when analytical solutions do not exist or when 
multiple integrations are needed to generate analytical solutions (Dai et al. 2013). For 
instance, the binomial lattice model developed by Cox et al. (1979) provides intuitive 
solutions if there is only one state variable. The three jump lattice model developed by 
Boyle (1988) can be used if there are two state variables. Clearly, some of these models 
may be able to provide solutions to cash flow uncertainty provided this uncertainty is 
not of an extreme nature and can be resolved within the investment horizon. However, 
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they are less able to handle uncertainty that can extend beyond the horizon and which 
can be unpredictable and extreme. Researchers have combated the presence of extreme 
cash flows by adapting real options models to handle these conditions4. In this paper, 
we adopt a model that attempts to overcome some of the deficiencies of earlier models. 
First, and unlike the models using a constant probability assumption, we postulate a 
stochastic probability model to handle cash flow uncertainties. Second, and in order to 
analyze the impact of ECFs, we utilize a lattice model with more tranches to accommo-
date ECFs. This model also differs from the constant discount rate/volatility trinomial 
tree model used in Boyle (1986). 
By definition, ECFs are rare and difficult to predict. The literature has developed “ex-
treme value theory” to assist managerial decision making under extreme conditions 
(Mandelbrot 1963, 1997). With increased onset of global financial crises (Burnie, De 
Ridder 2010), the modeling of downside risk (as a semi-variance) under extreme condi-
tions has received more attention (Teversy, Kahneman 1974; Unser 2000). In addition 
to the traditional benchmarks (the original investment, the risk free rate, and market 
returns), investors use additional measures to capture downside risk (Veld, Veld-Merk-
oulova 2008) for evaluation purposes. Managers also invest in negative NPV projects 
because of overconfidence (Ahmed, Duellman 2013) or agency related issues (Pyo et al. 
2012). Instead of acknowledging/correcting their errors, managers sometimes continue 
to invest in negative NPV projects (Clayton, Reisel 2013). Informational asymmetries 
exacerbate such problems if managers underestimate the probability and/or the amount 
of loss if projects fail (Chaplinsky, Haushalter 2010). 
Finally, Knight and Pretty (1998) suggest that management actions in managing cata-
strophic events (or extreme events) play a significant part in how firms recover from 
these events. They present examples of firms that went bankrupt from extreme events 
(for example, Valujet after the 1982 crash) to those that recovered completely after such 
events (for example, Johnson & Johnson after the Tylenol poisoning events). To quote 
(Knight, Pretty 1998), the ability for firms to recover from catastrophic events depends 
on “the company’s ability to deal with the aftermath of the loss” (p. 40). Unstated here 
is the notion that the company may also need some time to manage the extreme loss 
problem.
2. The model and settings
The Cox et al. (1979) binomial tree framework is used to provide the basis for our 
simulated based investigation of the managerial decision making impact of ECFs. The 
real options based methodology provides a perfect platform to examine the impact of 
the “abandon” decision inherent in sequential investments. The ability and flexibility of 
assigning actual values to path dependence investment decision make the real options 
method distinctive from the others managerial decision analysis methods (Adner, 
4 These models are described below in section 2.
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Levinthal 2004). Real options methodologies have also been introduced by Fernandes 
et al. (2012) and Fisch and Zschoche (2012) to model decision making under uncertainty 
where firms face cash flow turbulence and/or changing environmental landscapes. 
Finally, the importance of preserving perceived/operational flexibilities in the valuation 
process has been shown by Hu et al. (2013). 
Furthermore, and unlike the constant probability assumption in the literature, a stochas-
tic probability model is used in this paper to capture future cash flow uncertainty. Also, 
unlike the Boyle (1986) trinomial tree with the constant discount rate/volatility assump-
tion model, more tranches are introduced into the lattice structure to accommodate both 
types of uncertainties proposed here. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we provide in-
sights into the specific interaction of the different factors that create extreme losses and 
those that do not. We will examine the conditions under which retention of a bad project 
can generate profits for the firm in the long term5. We believe that a firm can benefit in 
the long run from the actions of a manager who is prone towards assumption of greater 
risks in the short term. We will examine the interplay of a scenario where both types 
of extremes occur simultaneously, and attempt to provide policy implications for firms. 
The specific model used in this paper is a three jump model originally developed by 
Boyle (1988) and based on the Cox et al. (1979) basic binomial tree model. This model 
has three possible outcomes for every time period, i.e. up, down and extreme down, 
and allows us to model ECF situations easily. For instance, if the normal situation is 
modeled, then the up, down, and extreme down scenarios can be used to capture normal 
increases in cash flows, decreases in cash flows, and unprecedented decreases in cash 
flow, respectively. Unprecedented (or extreme) decreases in cash flow can be caused by 
economic crises, significant technological breakthroughs in the industry, and/or faulty 
managerial decision making. We next consider the case where managers make con-
tinuous capital investment decisions. Project returns, assumed random each period for 
all periods over the investment horizon, are discounted using a postulated rate. Since 
returns are assumed stochastic, simulation based methodology is used since analytical 
solutions are difficult. 
Our purpose is to examine returns on investments under two distinct extreme condi-
tions. First, we postulate the presence of three types of managers who behave differently 
towards risk taking insofar as capital projects are concerned. The first manager is the 
‘extreme’ (or aggressive) manager whose investment strategy is to continue to invest 
despite negative expected returns6. The second manager is assumed to be a rational 
investor who possesses perfect information with respect to the probability distribution 
of future cash flows, and is the rational manager making decisions with perfect informa-
5 Likewise, although we do not explicitly examine the case where adoption of a good project can prove 
disastrous for the firm in the long run, our results provide a basis for inferring that this can be the 
case. Researchers may examine this issue further.
6 We will describe the different types of managers postulated for the simulation process more fully 
later in this section.
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tion7. Finally, the third manager makes rational decisions with imperfect information8. 
The first manager is the “extreme” manager whereas the third manager is the (typical) 
rational manager and can be viewed as the “normal” manager. The second manager 
possesses perfect foresight with respect to the future distribution of cash flows, and is 
used as a benchmark for comparison purposes.
We next model the second type of extremity as the one involving future cash flows. The 
first case is one where there is no possibility of ECFs. ECFs are allowed to occur in 
the second model. Together, we use simulation methodology to examine the interplay 
between the two types of extremities (the aggressive manager and ECFs) in the paper. 
We now explicitly document the parameters of the model and the dynamics of the 
investment decision-making process facing the manager:
1. Each manager (extreme, rational with perfect information, and rational with im-
perfect information) is assumed to have a reserved belief derived from his specific 
knowledge related to the project under consideration. The manager assumes that 
the capital investment will be profitable with a probability pi during period i. Thus, 
there is a probability (1– pi) that the project will suffer losses. 
2. The future probability of the investments being profitable is assumed fixed at eip  , 
and is a function of pi–1 and the manager’s private knowledge.
3. NPV is calculated n periods into the future based on the generated expected profit 
probability of the project. Appropriate accept/reject decisions made using NPV 
criteria will determine project retention or abandonment. 
4. It is also assumed that “nature” reveals the probability pi. At the end of the period, 
the gain/loss associated with the investment is realized.
5. The manager uses new information to update old probabilities pi+1, i.e. 1eip + . 
6. These steps are repeated till the end of the investment horizon. 
We also assume implicitly that investors are risk neutral and do not interfere in any way 
with decisions made by management. In other words, we assume that the manager’s 
decisions are credible and these decisions can be operationalized even if they are viewed 
as being aggressive by the investor. 
Unlike previous studies, we do not assume that pi ≡ p for all i, but instead assume that 
pi is stochastic and identically distributed in (0, 1) space for all i. Therefore, the future 
cash flow uncertainty can be examined in this paper. We adopt a discrete approxima-
tion for this underlying stochastic process to provide a transparent and computationally 
efficient model for this valuation problem. All notations used in our analysis are shown 
in Table 1. 
7 This is not to suggest that the manager can never be wrong. In fact, we argue that the only infor-
mation the manager has is the probability distribution of each outcome, and not the outcome itself. 
Hence, this type of manager can make mistakes.
8 In other words, the manager does not have access to the exact probability distribution of future cash 
flows.
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Next, appropriate benchmarks need to be established in order to simulate the decision-
making process under ECF conditions. Two different benchmarks are established – one 
to evaluate the behavior of the extreme manager, and the second to evaluate the impact 
of ECFs, both on firm returns. Hence, we postulate three different types of decision 
makers (managers) who adopt three different strategies. These managers are, respec-
tively, the uninformed rational manager, the informed manager and the aggressive man-
ager (as described earlier). An uninformed rational manager makes decisions following 
the dynamics of the decision process listed above. Because of incomplete information 
about pi available to the manager, the uninformed rational manager has to develop fu-
ture probabilities  eip  based on historical data, pi–1, and his judgment of the probability 
during the previous period, 1eip − . An informed manager, however, has knowledge of 
future probability distributions and is able to use this information to make investment 
decisions. In contrast, an aggressive manager does not have the knowledge of future 
probabilities of up/down movements, and moreover does not act rationally. He can still 
insist on investing despite a negative NPV realization for a given period. The aggressive 
manager’s behavior is characterized as an extreme case, as stated previously9.
To conclude the parameterization process, we will provide three explicit variables that 
we will change exogenously. First, we express exogenous investment costs in each 
9 The actual NPV based yardsticks for comparing the different models will be presented after describ-
ing the model as it is used in the current paper.
Table 1. Notations
Notation Meaning
u Up movement; 1 + the percentage increase of up movement over each period
d Down movement; 1 – the percentage decrease of down movement over each period
de 
Extreme down movement; 1 – the percentage decrease of extreme down 
movement over each period
pi Probability of up movement in period i
e
ip
Expected probability of up movement since period i, because of information 
asymmetry
pi,j Probability of the occurrence of node (i, j) 
Si Cash flow (return) in period i
Xi,j Expected return of node (i, j) from period i to the end period 
Ci Cost of investment in each period i
bi Down movement tendency parameter in period i
r Discount rate
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2015, 16(5): 877–900
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period as a fraction of each period’s cash flows, and label the fraction as ai and refer 
to it as the cost ratio10. We will consider the decision-making behavior of each type of 
manager and for each type of cash flows under different values of ai. Next, we will vary 
the investment horizon from 1 to 15 periods and examine managerial decision-making 
behavior as a function of the investment horizon. Finally, we will alter the discount rate 
(r) and examine the results. In the next subsection, the benchmark model process under 
manager irrationality is outlined, followed by a discussion of the process that incorpo-
rates the possibility of extreme cash flows into the previous framework. 
2.1. The benchmark model process under possible manager irrationality
As stated in (Cox et al. 1979), a binomial lattice may be viewed as a probability tree 
with binary chance branches. Here the uncertainty lies in the return of the investment 
in any stage. Initially, we introduce a binary tree model to capture the nature of the 
decision process, which we label as the benchmark model. In this model, we assume 
that there are only two possible outcomes, moving up (u) with a probability pi and 
down (d) with 1 – pi, for the investment in each period i and represents the normal 
situation11. Exogenous investment costs in each period are denoted by Ci, expressed as 
a proportion of the period 0 cash flow, i.e. Ci = ai S0, where ai is the cost ratio and S0 
the cash flow in period 0. 
We consider an n-period investment process. Cash flows will be discounted at the rate of 
r per period. If the probability of an up movement is pi in period i, the expected payoff 
from the investment for an arbitrary node ji + 2j = 1 in period i is:
 ( ), 1, 1, 11 ,i j i i j i i jX p X p X′ ′+ + += + −   (1)
where Xi+1, j is associated with an up movement, and Xi+1, j+1 with a down movement, ip′  
can be pi or eip , based on the type of the manager who makes the decision. If , 0i jX ≤  , then this node (i, j) has no offspring and implies that the manager will stop investing 
in the project. The difference between the expected payoff, Xi,j and the realized payoff 
(cash flow), denoted by Si,j, on a node (i, j) is not probability-dependent. Knowledge of 
the location of node (i, j) uniquely identifies the value of Si,j, obtained by multiplying 
any of its predecessor’s payoff by u, or d (or de in the extreme model described in the 
next section). Despite many possible realizations at each stage, we can uniquely identify 
the historical path. For example, independent of the path actually chosen by nature at 
any stage (for instance, at stage i + 2), the manager possesses knowledge of the actual 
10 The variable “cost ratio” is thus an indicator of investment cost in each period. In the model we 
assume that new costs related to the project surface in each period. In order to preserve tractability, 
we postulate that these new costs are functions of the initial investment I0. We model investment 
uncertainty over time by changing the alpha ratio and studying the impact of changing cost ratios 
on NPVs. Hence, once alphas are exogenously fixed, they remain constant for the duration of the 
simulation runs. By changing alphas, we model investment cost uncertainty. Since we change alphas 
exogenously, for each simulation run, these costs are assumed fixed. 
11 As shown in Figure 1, the outcome resulting from moving up (u) and then down (d) in value is the 
same as the outcome from moving down (d) and then up (u). Thus, this probability tree is recom-
bined, since there are numerous paths to the same outcomes, which significantly reduces the number 
of nodes in the lattice. 
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node being realized, as shown in Figure 2. Hence, for period i + 3, the manager has 
only two choices to worry about. If Si denotes the realized payoff for period i, it can be 
shown from Figure 2 that 1 1,1 i i iS S uS+ += = , and 2 2, 2 1i i iS S dS+ + += = , for all i.
The probability of any node j in period i can be determined by a probability extension 
of lower order, given by the following formula:
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It can be seen from (2) that the probability of any final branch on the decision tree is 
a cumulative conditional function. Hence, although volatility tends to decrease with 
time, the transition process assumed in our model is random and memory less, i.e., it’s 
a Markovian process12.
The objective is to determine which strategy generates the highest payoff for the firm. 
To achieve this, we compute the NPV of total returns simulated for each type of man-
ager (the uninformed, the informed, and the aggressive). Assuming that arbitrage op-
portunities do not exist, the value of the investment option today is determined by the 
















where k is the terminating period for the investment, and r is the discount factor. The 
NPVs generated based on extreme, rational with imperfect information as well as ra-
12 However, the probability distribution at any point in time is exogenously determined. The impact 
of changes in this function on results is left for future research.
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tional with perfect information strategies are respectively denoted by NPVX, NPVII and 
NPVPI. Obviously, since we postulated three different types of managers, the simu-
lated NPVs of total returns over time are expected to be different in the long run. Our 
purpose is to compare these three NPV’s using results generated through Monte Carlo 
simulation.
2.2. Extreme value model: the possibility of extreme cash flows
The above model incorporates only one type of extremity, namely, manager irrationality. 
In this section, we now add the possibility of ECFs and refer it as the Extreme Value 
Model (EVM). Figure 3 provides the probability schematic for the EVM. As shown in 
Figure 3, in addition to the possibility of a good cash flow outcome (moving up), there 
are two bad outcomes (d and de) that can possibly occur in each period. d captures the 
normal downward movement outlined earlier, while de captures the possibility of an 
extreme loss, and ed d . Assuming that the probability of the cash flow moving up 
is pi, the total probability of negative cash flows is 1 – pi. Conditional on the cash flow 
realizations being negative, the probability of smaller (normal) losses is portrayed by 
probability bi, with 1 – bi being the conditional probability of an extremely negative 
cash flow. Therefore the probabilities of , , eu d d  movements in period i are, respectively, 
( ) ( )( ), 1 , 1 1i i i i ip p pβ − −β − . 
As with the benchmark case presented earlier, the probability of any node j in period 
i can be determined by a probability extension of lower order, given by the following 
formula:
 
, , 1, 1 3
|
i
i j i j jix






∏ .  (4)
Clearly, the probability of the occurrence of any node depends solely on its own unique 
father node, as shown in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. Trinomial probability tree of extreme value model
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In the trinomial probability model of Figure 3, we do not assume that 2 n ed u d= × . This 
implies that a conventional trinomial tree cannot be developed analytically. However, 
since e eu d d u× = × , the number of branches remains finite. 
The expected investment payoff for an arbitrary node j in period i is given by:
 ( ) ( )( ), 1, 3 2 1, 3 1 1, 31 1 1 ,i j i i j i i i j i i i jX p X p X p X′ ′ ′+ − + − += + β − + −β −   (5)
where 1, 3 2i jX + − is associated with an up movement, 1, 3 1i jX + −  a normal down move-
ment, and 1, 3i jX +  with an extreme down movement; ip′  can be pi or eip , based on the 
type of the manager who makes the decision. If , 0i jX ≤ , then this node (i, j) has no 
offspring. Table 2 presents the different types of normal and extreme situations inves-
tigated in the paper. 




Uninformed rational (the normal manager) NPVIIB NPVIIE
Informed rational (the perfect foresight manager) NPVPIB NPVPIE
Aggressive, occasionally irrational (the extreme manager) NPVXB NPVXE
3. Numerical analysis
For the uninformed rational manager and the aggressive manager, since they don’t know 
the probability of up or down movements for each period, they adopt the following 
schematic to develop the probability trees based on the historical path and their own 
judgments. Their expected probability realization is given by the following formula:
 ( )1112
e e
i iip p p −−= + . 
We apply the Monte Carlo method to simulate the investment process with 
( ) ( )( )1 1~ max , 0 , min ,1 ,  1,1 0i i ip U p p i− −− δ + δ ∀ ≥ > δ > . The reason we assume that pi 
is uniformly distributed in ( ) ( )( )1 1max , 0 , min ,1 i ip p− −− δ + δ (instead of ( )~ 0,1 ip U  ), is to avoid sudden drastic changes in probability between adjacent periods. For example, 
if the economy is good, the probabilities of up movements should be consistently higher 
in consecutive periods than other times. The smaller the d value, the more consistent 
will be the probability outcome. In our simulation, we set d = .5 so that in adjacent 
periods the probability will not record extreme high or low values.
3.1. Benchmark model and results: normal cash flows  
with possible manager irrationality
We first examine the benchmark model that only involves two options of movement 
for each stage or period. Investment cost Ci is simplified to C = aS0 for all periods. We 
also restrict the percentage increase in the stock price to be u = 1.2 and the percentage 
decrease to be d = 0.83. Without loss of generality, the maximum depth of the investment 
horizon is assumed to be 15. We use NPV differences between extreme and rational with 
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imperfect information strategies and NPV differences between extreme, NPVX – NPVII, 
and rational with perfect information strategies, NPVX – NPVPI, as our major measures 
of performance for the firm. 
3.1.1. Cost ratio
Figure 4 presents a series of NPV differences, NPVX – NPVII under different values of 
the cost ratio a. Based on these graphs, the extreme strategy dominates the rational with 
imperfect information strategy, as the investment horizon increases, especially when r 
is close to 0. Aggressive decisions are more likely to pay off under a deeper investment 
horizon, and it’s almost certain with a long investment horizon. As a increases, the 
advantage of the extreme strategy over the rational with imperfect information strategy 
increases initially and decreases after a certain threshold. To generalize, extreme 
decisions are less preferable when the cost of investment is either too small or too big. 
This finding is also supported by simulation results we obtained from investigating the 
NPV difference, NPVX – NPVPI. There seem to be no significant differences between the 
outcomes with or without perfect information as long as the decision maker is rational. 
3.1.2. Investment horizon
The importance of the time horizon in investment decisions has been widely discussed 
in finance (Block 1972). Except under the special case when n = 2, and as depicted in 
any of the graphs in Figure 5, the extreme strategy dominates the rational with imperfect 
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information strategy when the cost ratio is far from its two extremes (i.e, when a = 0, 
or 1). A smaller discount rate strengthens this dominance. From n = 2 through n = 12, 
the advantages of an extreme strategy appear increasingly significant. In particular, 
when n = 12, most of the surface of NPVX – NPVII is above the 0-plane, implying that 
the extreme strategy is preferred to the other strategies here.
3.1.3. Discount rate
Discount rates are related to the marginal rate of substitution between current and future 
consumption, and may depend on factors that determine the marginal utility that include 
time preferences (Benzion et al. 1989). Researchers have suggested that firms should 
not pay today if catastrophic events are expected to occur in the very distant future, 
even thoug the cost of insurance is very small (Lind 1990). The simulation results for 
changing discount rates presented graphically in Figure 6 suggest that except when r = 
0, all graphs display a concave-like structure in the investment horizon cross section. As 
r increases, there are more instances where NPVX – NPVII becomes negative. Hence, a 
larger discount rate will make the rational strategy more valuable. 
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Figure 7 exhibits cross-sectional views of NPVX – NPVII in greater detail. With a small 
discount rate (for example, when r = 0.1), the extreme strategy dominates other strate-
gies especially when the investment horizon increases, but this domination gets at-
tenuated as r increases. Given fixed values for r and n, the curve of NPVX – NPVII is 
roughly quasi-concave with respect to a. Therefore, we can theoretically find an invest-
ment cost a* which maximizes the advantage of an extreme strategy13. 
Overall, the results under normal cash flows and possible manager irrationality lead to 
the following conclusions: 1) Firms with extreme managers and normal cash flow pat-
terns do not suffer losses in most cases, but especially with low cost ratios and/or long 
horizons. 2) Firms fare better with rational managers for high discount rate or short ho-
rizons. 3) Manager irrationality will have minimal impact on firm level profitability for 
long-term projects with long horizon, and advantages decrease with cost ratio increases. 

































































































Fig. 6. Differences in NPV, (NPVX – NPVII) under different discount rates, r;  
imperfect information strategies
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3.2. Extreme value model and results: modeling extreme cash flow situations
In this section, we introduce ECFs into the modelling process. As before, we allow 
three types of managers and postulate investment cost Ci as C = aS0 for all periods. 
We assume bi = b = 0.8 for all periods for simplicity. Next, the maximum investment 
horizon depth is assumed to be 13 and the percentage increase in the stock price is 
assumed to be u = 1.2. Similarly, we assume that the percentage decrease is d = 0.83, 
and the percentage decrease in extreme cash flows to be de = 0.083. As before, we 
use the differences in NPV, namely, NPVX – NPVII and NPVX – NPVPI, as our major 
measure of performance. Finally, we will examine the impact of ECF changes under 
three control variables, namely, cost ratios, investment horizons, and discount rates. 
Fig. 7. Cross-sectional view of difference in NPV, (NPVX – NPVII) under various  
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As indicated in an earlier section, there is a chance ( )( )1 1i ip′− β − , albeit slim, that the 
investment will go extremely bad14. The importance of investigating this model is two-
fold. On the one hand, for all cases where extreme losses do not occur, we can check 
if the results are similar to what was observed under the benchmark model. Clearly, 
even under these scenarios, it is possible that extreme down movements may never be 
realized. However, there is always a chance (even if small) of its occurrence. Hence, we 
would like to provide decision making strategies for firms when facing ECFs.
3.2.1. Cost ratio
Figure 8 presents results of these runs. The extreme strategy begins to lose its dominance 
over the normal case as cash flows become more extreme. With low cost ratios, the 
14 If not, this investment project may be easily declined at the outset.
Fig. 8. Differences in NPV, (NPVX – NPVII) under different cost ratios;  
with/without extreme cases
NPV – NPV in non extrime casesX II









































NPV – NPV in non extrime casesX II
























NPV – NPV in non extrime casesX II










W. Zhang et al. Sequential capital investment decision making under extreme cash flow situations ...
893
extreme strategy is more preferable for extreme cases than for non-extreme cases. A 
long investment horizon and a high discount rate can strengthen the superiority of the 
extreme strategy for extreme cases. The extreme strategy is more likely to dominate 
the rational strategy if the investment cost is within the non-extreme ranges. The 
advantages of the extreme strategy over the rational strategy become less clear with long 
investment horizons and small discount rates. The extreme strategy with extreme cases 
dominates other strategies with small cost ratios, but this dominance decreases rapidly 
with increases in cost ratios. When extreme down movement occurs, and as investment 
costs increase, the rational strategy becomes the preferred strategy. 
3.2.2. Investment horizon
Figure 9 presents simulation results when the investment horizon is changed. Specifically, 
the difference (NPVX – NPVII), with or without extreme cases, is presented. The extreme 
strategy is more likely to dominate over longer horizons, for both normal and ECFs. 
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The extreme strategy dominates the rational strategy when extreme cases occur over 
the long term, especially if small cost ratios occur at the same time. This dominance is 
more profound when only normal cash flows are considered, for small discount rates. 
This advantage extends to intermediate cost ratios as well. For ECF cases, the extreme 
strategy dominates for small cost ratios and high discount rates. 
3.2.3. Discount rate
In this section, we now explore how discount rate changes affect the dominating 
strategy. Figure 10 presents the results from these runs. One important insight is that 
with normal cash flows, the extreme strategy loses its dominant position with increases 
in the discount rate, but not under ECF conditions. With ECFs, the extreme strategy 
maintains its dominance even with increases in the discount rate, and this result can 
easily be rationalized. A high discount rate reduces both positive and negative cash 
Fig. 10. Differences in NPV, (NPVX – NPVII) under different discount rates;  
with/without extreme cases
NPV – NPV in non extrime casesX II
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flows in a similar manner for the entire horizon. Given this, the manager may be less 
worried about ECFs with high discount rates since now the manager can assume more 
risk without penalty. In the long run, this strategy pays off. Finally, extreme strategy 
maintains dominance with extended investment horizons and when cost ratios are high 
or low.
Table 3 outlines the (generally) best strategies when manager irrationality and/or when 
extreme cash flow situations are present15. These situations are compared to the “nor-
mal” situation when managers are assumed to make decisions with imperfect informa-
tion. The major message is that firms can benefit under both of the extreme cases.
Based on the simulations under ECF, firms can be better off with an extreme manager 
when it faces ECFs under many circumstances. An extreme manager’s strategies to as-
sume risks can pay dividends for firms facing long term ECF situations. Simulations 
reveal that the NPVs with an irrational manager dominate the NPVs with a rational 
manager with imperfect information for a variety of situations. 
3.2.4. The terminal evolution of decision variables
Managers have the option to continue/terminate projects at any point within the 
investment horizon. Defining “decision depth” as the number of periods that a manager 
continues investment in a project, Figure 11 presents simulation results where decision 
depths are measured under various values of discount rates and investment horizons 
for both normal and ECFs. Based on these results, it seems that the decision depth is 
generally less under ECFs than under normal cash flows. Moreover, there seems to be 
a greater degree of randomness in decision depth values for normal cash flows than 
for ECFs. These results are intuitive – ECFs and higher discount rates severely inhibit 
depth16.
The results of the simulation runs involving depth measured relative to the investment 
horizon (the decision depth ratio) are presented in Figure 12. Not surprisingly, the 
15 Note that these conclusions are generally valid, but not always so.
16 Similarly, large cost ratios reduce the decision depth and the decision depth ratio for both types of 
cash flows.
Table 3. Which strategy is more likely to dominate
Cash flow type Control variables Small Large
Normal cash flows Cost Ratio Aggressive Rational
Investment Horizon Rational Aggressive
Discount Rate Aggressive Rational
Extreme cash flows Cost Ratio Aggressive Rational
Investment Horizon Rational Aggressive
Discount Rate Rational Aggressive
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results and the conclusions are similar to what was reported earlier – larger discount 
rates/cost ratios/investment horizons shorten the decision depth ratios. In other words, 
when the investment horizon increases, the rational manager is more likely to be con-
servative. ECFs also inhibit the ratio since with extreme cases it seems likely that the 
projects will be rejected earlier than under normal cash flows. 
Conclusions, managerial insights and suggestions for further research
Uncertainty plays an important role in shaping firm choice involving continuing/
terminating sequential projects. Given appreciable uncertainty about cash inflows 
(especially extremely negative cash inflows), a firm may face the unpleasant prospect 
of needing to curtail operations significantly, or, even worse, file for bankruptcy. In this 
paper, we provide simulation runs that deal with volatility, namely the possibility that 
firms face extreme cash flows. In addition, we also incorporate the volatility associated 







































































































Fig. 11. Decision depth under different uncertainty scenarios, with and without extreme cases
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The major message of the simulation runs conducted in this paper is that firms who hire 
aggressive managers can generally reap long term dividends when the cost ratios and/
or discount rates are small, or the investment horizons are high, if cash flows follow 
normal patterns. With small cost ratios/discount rates, accepting unprofitable projects in 
the short run may not prove disastrous since the firm may easily recover in the long run. 
Long investment horizons allow firms’ better opportunities for future long term positive 
cash flows, even if the other two control variables are high. These possibilities may have 
been missed by a rational/imperfect information manager who may have terminated the 
project once it reaches a threshold negative cash flow level. These long-term profits may 
be captured by the aggressive manager under certain circumstances. 
The results for ECF cases suggest that the firm’s NPV with an aggressive manager also 
dominates those under rational strategies under a wide range of cost ratio/investment ho-
rizon/discount rate assumptions. This is a counter-intuitive result. The longer horizon (or 
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the low cost ratio/discount rates) also provides the opportunity for positive cash flows 
in the long term to even overcome ECFs. Rational or imperfect managers’ rejection of 
short term negative projects also implies that they lose the opportunity to participate in 
possible recovery in future years, even with ECF possibilities. Clearly, firms must first 
determine its exposure to ECF. If this possibility exists, and if the investment horizon is 
large, the firm may benefit by quietly encouraging its managers to assume greater risks. 
The model of this paper can be extended in at least three ways. Our model that captures 
extreme negative cash flows may be extended to accommodate the possibility of positive 
extreme cash flows. We believe that this scenario will prove further the benefits of hiring 
aggressive managers. Second, we have not modeled the impact of the nature of market 
competition on the results. If firms are operating in a monopoly/oligopoly environment, 
it is possible that they enjoy the benefits of a longer horizon with less competition to al-
low for aggressive managers’ risk taking behavior to bear fruit eventually in the form of 
positive cash flows for the firm. However, in competitive industries, firms may not have 
the luxury of investing in projects with losses in the short term. The reduced barriers to 
entry into the industry force competitive firms to reject unprofitable projects in the short 
run with greater frequency than for firms with strong barriers to entry. The degree of 
market concentration can be modeled as another variable and its impact on the results 
examined. Finally, the model assumes that the probability distribution was exogenously 
determined and fixed at each point in time. Relaxing this assumption provides fruitful 
avenues for further research.
References
Abel, A. B.; Dixit, A. K.; Eberly, J. C.; Pindyck, R. S. 1996. Options, the value of capital, and 
investment, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(3): 753–777. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2946671
Adner, R.; Levinthal, D. A. 2004. What is not a real option: considering boundaries for the ap-
plication of real options to business strategy, Academy of Management Review 29(1): 74–85.
Ahmed, A. S.; Duellman, S. 2013. Managerial overconfidence and accounting conservatism, 
Journal of Accounting Research 51(1): 1–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2012.00467.x
Benzion, U.; Rapoport, A.; Yagil, J. 1989. Discount rates inferred from decisions: an experimental 
study, Management Science 35(3): 270–284. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.35.3.270
Black, F.; Scholes, M. 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities, The Journal of 
Political Economy 81(3): 637–654. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/260062
Block, F. E. 1972. Time horizon, Financial Analysts Journal 28(5): 30–62. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/faj.v28.n5.30
Boyle, P. P. 1986. Option valuation using a three-jump process, International Options Journal 
3(1): 7–12.
Boyle, P. P. 1988. A lattice framework for option pricing with two state variables, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 23(1): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2331019
Brennan, M. J.; Schwartz, E. S. 1985. Evaluating natural resource investments, Journal of Busi-
ness 58(2): 135–157. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/296288
Burnie, D. A.; De Ridder, A. 2010. Far tail or extreme day returns, mutual fund cash flows and 
investment behaviour, Applied Financial Economics 20(16): 1241–1256. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09603107.2010.489885
W. Zhang et al. Sequential capital investment decision making under extreme cash flow situations ...
899
Chang, C. C.; Chen, M. Y. 2012. Re-examining the investment-uncertainty relationship in a real 
options model, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 38(2): 241–255. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11156-011-0227-2
Chaplinsky, S.; Haushalter, D. 2010. Financing under extreme risk: contract terms and returns to 
private investments in public equity, Review of Financial Studies 23(7): 2789–2820. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq035
Clayton, M. J.; Reisel, N. 2013. Value creation from asset sales: new evidence from bond and 
stock markets, Journal of Corporate Finance 22: 1–15. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.03.002
Cox, J. C.; Ross, S. A.; Rubinstein, M. 1979. Option pricing: a simplified approach, Journal of 
Financial Economics 7(3): 229–263. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(79)90015-1
Dai, T. S.; Wang, C. J.; Lyuu, Y. D. 2013. A multiphase, flexible, and accurate lattice for pricing 
complex derivatives with multiple market variables, Journal of Futures Markets 33(9): 795–826. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/fut.21565
Denison, C. A.; Farrell, A. M.; Jackson, K. E. 2012. Managers’ incorporation of the value of real 
options into their long-term investment decisions: an experimental investigation, Contemporary 
Accounting Research 29(2): 590–620. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2011.01116.x
Dixit, A. K. 1989. Entry and exit decisions under uncertainty, Journal of Political Economy 
97(3): 620–638. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261619
Dixit, A. K. 1994. Investment under uncertainty. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Fernandes, R.; Gouveia, B.; Pinho, C. 2012. Product mix strategy and manufacturing flexibility, 
Journal of Manufacturing Systems 31(3): 301–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmsy.2012.02.001
Fisch, J. H.; Zschoche, M. 2012. The role of operational flexibility in the expansion of interna-
tional production networks, Strategic Management Journal 33(13): 1540–1556. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/smj.1999
Hu, C.; Jiang, W.; Lee, C. F. 2013. Managerial flexibility and the wealth effect of new product 
introductions, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 41(2): 273–294. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11156-012-0310-3
Hubbard, R. G. 1994. Investment under uncertainty: keeping one’s options open, Journal of 
Economic Literature 32(4): 1816–1831.
Knight, R. F.; Pretty, D. J. 1996. The impact of catastrophes on shareholder value. Templeton 
College.
Knight, R. F.; Pretty, D. J. 1998. Value at risk: the effects of catastrophes on share price, Risk 
Management 45: 39–42.
Lind, R. C. 1990. Reassessing the government’s discount rate policy in light of new theory 
and data in a world economy with a high degree of capital mobility, Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 18(2): S8–S28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(90)90035-W
List, J. A.; Haigh, M. S. 2010. Investment under uncertainty: testing the options model with 
professional traders, The Review of Economics and Statistics 92(4): 974–984. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00041
Lund, D. 1993. The lognormal diffusion is hardly an equilibrium price process for exhaustible 
resources, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 25(3): 235–241. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1993.1045
Mandelbrot, B. B. 1963. The variation of certain speculative prices, The Journal of Business 
36(4), 394–419. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/294632
Mandelbrot, B. B. 1997. The variation of certain speculative prices. New York: Springer. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2763-0_14
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2015, 16(5): 877–900
900
Merton, R. C.; Brennan, M. J.; Schwartz, E. S. 1977. The valuation of american put options The 
Journal of Finance 32(2): 449–462. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03284.x
Pindyck, R. S. 1991. Irreversibility, uncertainty and investment, Journal of Economic Literature 
29(3): 1110–1148.
Pyo, U.; Shin, Y. J.; Thompson, H. E. 2012. Reducing agency conflicts with target debt ratios, 
Journal of Economics and Finance 3: 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2167379
Rubinstein, M. 1976. The valuation of uncertain income streams and the pricing of options, The 
Bell Journal of Economics 7(2): 407–425. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3003264
Sewalk, S.; Dai, Q. 2014. Valuing real options in hospital expansions using vertical phasing, Real 
Estate Finance 30(4): 156–166.
Sharpe, W. F. 1964. Capital asset prices: a theory of market equilibrium under conditions of risk, 
The Journal of Finance 19(3): 425–442.
Teversy, A.; Kahneman, D. 1974. Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases, Science 
185(4157): 1124–1131. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
Tsekrekos, A. E.; Shackleton, M. B.; Wojakowski, R. 2012. Evaluating natural resource invest-
ments under different model dynamics: managerial insights, European Financial Management 
18(4): 543–575. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036X.2010.00544.x
Unser, M. 2000. Lower partial moments as measures of perceived risk: an experimental study, 
Journal of Economic Psychology 21(3): 253–280. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-4870(00)00004-0
Veld, C.; Veld-Merkoulova, Y. V. 2008. The risk perceptions of individual investors, Journal of 
Economic Psychology 29(2): 226–252. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2007.07.001
Wenqing ZHANG is Assistant Professor of Operations Management at the Labovitz School of Busi-
ness and Economics, University of Minnesota, Duluth. He earned his Ph.D. from McGill University. 
His research interests are in areas that include responsible operations/supply chain management, op-
erations management and marketing interface, game theoretic modeling, quantitative analysis, and 
optimization models. He has published several papers in these areas in international journals.
Prasad PADMANABHAN is Professor of Finance, Myra Stafford Pryor Chair of Free Enterprise, 
and Sam Walton Fellow, at the Greehey School of Business, St. Mary’s University, San Antonio, TX. 
He earned his Ph.D. from McGill University. A prolific researcher, he has published over 30 articles 
in several prominent professional and academic journals in a variety of areas that include finance, 
international finance, and international business.
Chia-Hsing HUANG is Professor of Finance and Vice Dean at SolBridge International School of 
Business, Daejeon, South Korea. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. He has 
taught and worked in the US, Taiwan, and Thailand. He has published extensively in many leading 
international journals.
W. Zhang et al. Sequential capital investment decision making under extreme cash flow situations ...
